Eliminating Terrorists, Not Terror

By Simon Saradzhyan for ISN Security Watch

Two suicide bombers blew themselves up in a downtown Moscow subway during the morning rush hour on 29 March, killing 39 people and injuring more than 70 others.

The bombs, which detonated within a 30-minute interval in trains at the Lubyanka and Park Kultury subway stations, contained explosives that were equivalent to four and two kilograms of TNW, respectively, and were packed with projectiles, according to a statement released by the National Counter-Terrorism Committee (NAK) later that day.

The Lubyanka station has a number of exits directly outside the headquarters of the Federal Security Service (FSB). According to some accounts, the second bomb was to have been detonated at the Oktyabrskaya station, one of whose exits is right outside the Interior Ministry. Such a choice of targets indicates an attempt to undermine the public’s perception of the ability of the Russian secret services and law enforcement agencies to protect them.

In his 29 March briefing to President Dmitry Medvedev, NAK chairman and FSB director Alexander Bortnikov said both female suicide bombers – whose faces had been captured by subway surveillance cameras – were most likely residents of the North Caucasus and belonged to terrorist groups “related” to this volatile region.

As of 29 March, no group had openly claimed responsibility for the attacks, which mark the return of large-scale terrorism to Moscow after a lull of more than five years.

However, in mid-February, Doku Umarov, leader of the self-styled North Caucasian emirate “Imarat Kavkaz,” vowed to take the war from that region to “mainland” Russia, claiming that he had revived the notorious Riyad-us-Saliheen suicide bombing squad. And suicide bombers are a signature of the North Caucasus-based insurgent groups, which have been responsible for the overwhelming majority of terrorist attacks in Russia.

These groups resumed their campaign of suicide bombings in the region more than a year ago after a lull of several years. There have been more than a dozen suicide bombings in southern Russia since 2009, and it was only a matter of time before this campaign expanded to the “mainland.”

In September 2009, law enforcrment intercepted two natives of Chechnya planning a suicide mission in Moscow during City Day celebrations. Subsequently, Ingush members of North Caucasus-based networks managed to bomb the Nevsky Express train en route from Moscow to St Petersburg, killing 27 in November 2009.

Russian special services and law enforcement agencies have recently scored a number of tactical victories over these groups, killing several key figures, including Said Buryatski, who had trained suicide bombers, and Anzor Astemirov, who had headed the networks in the republic of Kabardino-Balkaria.

This prompted a number of Russian policymakers and experts, including ex-FSB director Nikolai Kovalev, to speculate that the 29 March bombings were meant to avenge for these killings. That may be the case with Said Buryatski, who was killed on 2 March, but not with Astemirov, who was killed on 25 March, leaving little time to prepare for such a complex operation as a major suicide bombing in Moscow.

Regardless of whether revenge was among the motives, the 29 March bombings once again underscore a number of important facts and assumptions that Russian authorities need to address.

Perhaps, the most important is that the elimination of terrorist network leaders weakens these networks, but does not necessarily put an end to their activities.

In the past few years, Russian forces have managed to wipe out almost the entire leadership of the Chechen insurgency, excluding Umarov, but including all ‘presidents of Ichkeria’ and most of the warlords that gained prominence during both Chechen wars. Not a month goes by without law enforcement reporting that they have killed yet another self-styled ‘emir’ somewhere in the North Caucasus. Yet, new emirs emerge and insurgency continues to run strong in the region, having expanded from Chechnya to Ingushetia (where it now is even more robust than in Chechnya), Dagestan and other regional republics.

Umarov and his predecessors have already managed to ‘re-invent’ their cause from that of a separatist bid by Chechnya alone to that of defending all Muslims in the region from abuse by Russian authorities, and pursuing a caliphate in the North Caucasus.

Enough people in the North Caucasus appear to either be fanatically committed to this idea or to have been wronged by authorities, or both, to steadily replenish the ranks of suicide bombers in the region – despite the fact that the second Chechen war was declared to have been ended years ago and the regime of continuous counterterrorism operation in Chechnya has also been cancelled. And the hierarchy of ‘traditional’ Islam, which is loyal to the authorities, is failing to stem the rise of the militant Salafiya, whose followers take up arms and die not only to defend their beliefs, but also to spread them in hopes of establishing the aforementioned caliphate. Moscow and other parts of Russia will remain exposed to terrorist threats as long as the recruitment pool for such attacks fails to dry up, as suicide bombings are very difficult to intercept.

A number of laws have been passed to significantly expand the powers of law enforcement and national security agencies in the counterterrorism domain, while their budgets have been increased substantially in the past few years.

Russia’s counterterrorism hierarchy, which emerged in the wake of the hostage-taking tragedies in Moscow and Beslan and which is topped by the FSB, appears to be more adequate than what had been in place before the 2000s. But it will continue to produce the same organizational output unless it is fine tuned for a qualitative change. A thorough and non-compromising review by an independent body (like the 9/11 Commission in the US) could create a full picture of Russia’s response to terrorism, identifying flaws and issuing recommendations.

Medvedev’s decision to reform the Russian police is a clear sign that the law enforcement component requires further improvement. As part of the reform, plans are in the works to downsize the transport police and consolidate into eight regional directorates. Perhaps the fact that the two latest major terrorist attacks outside the North Caucasus have occurred in the transport system should prompt more thinking on how to reform this force.

Apart from improving counterterrorism capabilities, Russian authorities also need to do more to address the root causes of and contributing factors to terrorism and insurgency. In his first comments on the 29 March bombings, Medvedev vowed that “we will continue operations against terrorists without doubt to the end.” In reality, there will be no end to these operations until Russian leaders determine whether their counterterrorism course is comprehensive in its approach and effective in its implementation.

Simon Saradzhyan is a research fellow at the John F. Kennedy School of Government’s Belfer Center. His research interests include nuclear and conventional terrorism, international arms control as well as affairs in Russia and other Newly-Independent States. Prior to joining the Belfer Center, Simon worked as deputy editor of The Moscow Times. Previously Simon has worked as a researcher for EastWest Institute and as a consultant for the United Nations in Russia. Saradzhyan is author of several papers on terrorism and security, including “Russia’s Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons in Their Current Configuration and Posture: A Strategic Asset or Liability?” “Russia: Grasping Reality of Nuclear Terror” and “Russia’s System to Combat Terrorism.” This article first appeared at ISN Security Watch and is reprinted with the permission of the author.

Calls For Hamas To Stop Executions In Gaza

Amnesty International urged the Hamas de facto administration in Gaza Wednesday not to carry out several pending death sentences, after high-ranking officials signalled their intention to execute those convicted of “collaboration” with Israel and “murder”.

It is feared that these executions, which would be the first to be carried out in Gaza since 2005, may be carried out in the next few days, Amnesty International said.

Since seizing control of Gaza in 2007, Hamas has not carried out executions although its military courts have continued to hand down death sentences after proceedings that failed to meet international standards for fair trial.

“Hamas must not start carrying out executions. That would be a profoundly retrograde step and go against the emerging trend towards a worldwide moratorium on executions,” said Malcolm Smart, Director of Amnesty International’s Middle East and North Africa Programme.

“It would be especially abhorrent to execute prisoners who, as in these cases, were sentenced to death after proceedings which failed to meet international fair trial standards.”

Hamas has not released information on how many people could face execution. However, in 2009, a total of 14 people are known to have been sentenced to death by military courts in Gaza after being convicted on charges of “collaboration”, treason and murder.

On Sunday, the General Prosecution Office in Gaza said that ratification of outstanding death sentences was not only necessary but that it was a legal duty.

In a public statement issued on 25 March, Mohammed Abed, Hamas’s Attorney General in the Gaza Strip, announced that during the previous two months, the General Prosecution Office had begun the process of ratifying the death sentences of those convicted of “collaboration” and murder.

Two days earlier, Fathi Hammad, the Hamas Interior Minister in Gaza, said in a radio interview that his Ministry had decided to execute prisoners convicted of “collaboration” despite the objections of local human rights organizations.

Mohammed Abed has also said the death penalty will be used against people convicted of dealing drugs – “We have the right to hasten the execution of those who are willing to kill their own people”.

In November 2009, the Hamas de facto administration in Gaza approved a legal change that would permit the execution of convicted drug dealers.

Under Palestinian Law, death sentences must be ratified by the Palestinian Authority (PA) President before they can be carried out.

However, as a result of inter-factional tensions between the two main Palestinian political parties, Fatah and Hamas, since June 2007, the West Bank has been governed by a PA caretaker government appointed by PA President Mahmoud Abbas of the Fatah party and Gaza has been ruled by a Hamas de facto administration led by Isma’il Haniyeh.

After June 2007, PA President Abbas suspended operations of PA security forces and judicial institutions in Gaza, creating a legal and institutional vacuum there.

Hamas responded by creating a parallel law enforcement and judicial apparatus. These however lack appropriately trained personnel, accountability mechanisms or safeguards.

In May 2009, Hamas announced that it was establishing a committee composed of legal advisors and officials in the Hamas Ministry of Justice who would be responsible for ratifying death sentences in Gaza. The General Prosecution Office said on Sunday that the cabinet had a duty to help ratify death sentences in order to implement outstanding death penalties.

The last known executions in Gaza were carried out in June and July 2005, prior to the establishment of the Hamas de-facto administration in Gaza.

Four men were hanged in Gaza central prison and one was killed by firing squad in the Police headquarters in Gaza City. All five had been convicted of murder in earlier years, some by the State Security Court, which has since been abolished.

Rise Of Anti-Semitic Party Darkens Hungary’s Elections

By Robert Amsterdam

On March 15th, tens of thousands of people filled the streets of Hungary’s beautiful capital Budapest, ostensibly to celebrate the 162nd anniversary of the 1848-1948 revolution and war of independence. Among the many events commemorating this anniversary across city, a multitudinous political rally for the far-right party Jobbik garnered the most attention, as restless young supporters showed up sporting Hitler-like mustaches and army fatigues to hear the party leader Gábor Vona threaten retribution against corrupt lawmakers and “gypsy criminality.” With a parliamentary election coming up on April 11th, this increasingly popular nationalist party is sending a shock through minority communities in Hungary.

Some observers say we shouldn’t worry about Jobbik. The party is making an effort to portray itself as a normal, mainstream conservative party, but this thought disappears whenever Vona speaks in public: one of his favorite refrains is that “Hungary is for Hungarians,” and that the country must be stoutly defended from outside “foreign speculators,” often pointing to some imagined evil agenda of Israel in Central Europe. He has drawn up a long list of enemies (including the United States), and said he would shut down several television stations once in power. Given that the party is linked with the violent paramilitary brigade “Magyar Gárda,” which was banned last summer, these promises of violence are not just idle talk.

So there is a potentially threatening anti-Semitic political sentiment rising once again in Hungary, what else is new? Well it seems that this time things are different, as Jobbik is feared to headed toward winning as much as 20% of the vote in the upcoming April elections, giving them a significantly powerful block in parliament capable of great damage.

Considering the widespread alarm recently displayed following Jean-Marie Le Pen’s National Front party comeback in France which netted less than 12% of the national vote across all regions, we are looking at a situation which could be twice as bad in terms of seats – with Jobbik’s militaristic rhetoric and hate speech several notches above Le Pen’s brand of anti-immigrant xenophobia.
Hungarian and Central European Jewish communities are on red alert. Writing for the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Ruth Ellen Gruber interviews the academic Andras Kovacs of the Central European University: “Jobbik frequently uses anti-Semitic rhetoric, not directly but through code words and references, as well as symbols and appearances. (…) This is frightening for the Jewish population.” Kovacs continued, “Loud verbal anti-Semitism can lead to a very polarized and intense atmosphere, which in turn could facilitate, for example, anti-Jewish street violence.”

One example of the symbols appropriated by Jobbik has been the the flag of the Árpád Stripes, frequently carried by their supporters at rallies and often among the outlawed Hungarian Guard themselves. Though the origin of the flag has a deeply convoluted historical roots going back to the foundation of Hungarian national identity, it is most well known to remind people of the Arrow Cross Party, which for seven months in 1944-1945 formed an alliance with the Nazis. Whether or not the Arpad Stripes are an emblem of fascism may be up for debate, but for some the implication is clear.

The political gains of Jobbik are no accident, however, as dismal governance and poor economic management by the ruling Socialists (MSZP) party widely opened up the political field for certain victory for the center-right party Fidesz, which made a decision early on to run on almost no campaign, and ambiguously slide toward the majority vote. However few were able to predict just how strongly Jobbik would be able to pick off the Fidesz margins and overpass the left’s share of the vote – thanks in part to apathy and lower turnout. The current political concern is whether or not Fidesz will have to tilt further to the right and appeal to some of Jobbik’s base – though the party has ruled out any ruling coalition with the extremists. Oddly, the future of Hungary’s parliament will depend in large in the many voters who have chosen to stay home, or those willing to make a last minute switch to Fidesz to avoid more seats for Jobbik.

Even if the nationalist sensation currently subsuming Hungary did not feature the trappings of racism and anti-Semitism, the rise of Jobbik bodes ill for the country’s young membership in the European Union and its democratic and institutional future. Gábor Vona has pledged to “radically” reorient the country’s foreign policy toward the East, meaning the Moscow would gain control over a critical Central European state and look to continue its energy exploitation of the country which began under the defeated socialist Ferenc Gyurcsány, while hostile relations with Brussels, Washington, and the IMF are unlikely to help return Hungary to the path of economic growth and institutional stability.

To get a sense of the turning tide in Hungary, look no further than the treatment of Mayor of Budapest Gábor Demszky, a former anti-Communist hero, who was booed and harassed by angry crowds before his speech on the March 15 National Day. “The more seats Jobbik wins in parliament, the worse for the Hungarian nation and the more vulnerable Hungarian democracy will become,” he said, summarizing the central concern of this election.

Both Europe and the international community would do well to consider Demszky’s warning very carefully.

Robert Amsterdam is an international lawyer and founding partner of the law firm Amsterdam & Peroff. This article originally (here)  appeared at the Robert Amsterdam: Perspectives on Global Politics and Business website.

Dispatch From A Show Trial

By Grigory Pasko

March 31 will mark the one year anniversary of the start of the second trial of Mikhail Khodorkovsky. When a court trial drags on for more than a year, I need not listen to the hearsay, but rather I have had the “pleasure” of observing one from the inside.

Если Вы хотите прочитать оригинал данной статьи на русском языке, нажмите сюда.

This was not my first visit to the latest session of the Khamovnichesky Court in the case of the former YUKOS managers. I was amazed that, like a year ago, like half a year ago, like a month ago – there was a multitude of spectators. It is already obvious: interest in the trial, at the very least, has not weakened. And from the discussions in the net one can even say that it has grown: people understand ever more – the trial has obviously been ordered from above, is political, clearly unfair, and the power that has started it up in the first place clearly does not know what to do next.

That is, the repressive convoy-justice «machine» was put in motion long ago. Who will stop it and how – is something probably nobody understands or knows.

The «machine» does some very strange things at every step. First they declared the trial to be open, so much so that they even put television panels up in a separate hall – for direct broadcast of the trial. Soon they rejected this idea: it’s just uncustomary that everybody’s laughing at the prejudice, powerlessness and shabbiness of the thinking of the procurators, while they – are people of a delicate spiritual constitution.

In the courtroom it is cramped and stuffy. To record the trial on video and to photograph is also not allowed, although the trial is open. They say that this – is also at the demand of the spiritually woundable procurators.

A part of the «machine» are – the convoyers [Russian for the guards responsible for transporting prisoners–Trans.]. The young lads-robots, overdosed on bad action movies, with a delirious look and machine-guns atilt, appear ludicrous and laughable. But nobody’s told them about this. And they guard Khodorkovsky and Lebedev with such fury that one is even scared – for them themselves first and foremost: after all, you could get a heart attack from overdoing it like that.

The procurators carry their concerned look with a sense of procuratorial dignity. For some reason they’re dressed differently [Russian prosecutors generally wear matching light-blue military-style uniforms to work–Trans.] “Straight as a shot from a gun”, Lakhtin – in a suit and tie; the half-asleep Shokhin – in a shirt with a short sleeve and without a tie; Ibragimova, smiling at something – in a shirt with a long sleeve, but without a tie…. In a word, to use the terminology of Go’lchehra Ibragimova, one’s like Stenka, in a hat; another, like Juan, in a sombrero. They are sometimes cheerful, sometimes don’t even pose questions to the witnesses. But with great pleasure, as it appeared to me, they attempt to object against the defendants, when these pose their own questions to the witnesses.

Judge Danilkin is practically not even visible because of the table. He’s got a labored look and a dreary gaze. Both the look and the gaze literally say: I’m here by accident and not by my will; I don’t know what to do next and how to do next; we’re all in one boat, which is floating who knows where and is being led by who knows who.

He even pronounced a phrase that was pure genius for a judge:

– I’m covering for myself, so there wouldn’t be a situation…

A situation, moreover foul-smelling, nevertheless exists.

And it is this: the witnesses are stubbornly not testifying in favor of the prosecution.

If they (and after all, the procurators had presented them as prosecution witnesses!) had come to court and said: yes, we saw (heard, know, have proof in the form of documents, etc.) that Messrs. Khodorkovsky and Lebedev were pilfering oil and were getting for this unaccounted-for incomes, going away from the payment of taxes, having unlawfully in such a manner enriched themselves, then this whole trial would have ended a long time ago.

And there wouldn’t be any perpetually irritated procurators; lawyers and defendants worn out by the pointless stupidity of what is taking place; a judge cornered by boredom…

One of the permanent observers at the trial shared impressions with me: “Shokhin ought to be writing textbooks on demagogy – the person says remarkably much and not on topic.”

Unfortunately, that day Shokhin either kept his mouth shut, or slept.

Among the visitors in the hall – journalists, representatives of international organizations, former employees of the YUKOS company.. .I met my acquaintances and colleagues from Reporters without Borders and International French radio.

The defendants, despite all this, look and hold themselves well and participate actively in the trial. Possibly more actively than anybody else. I understand them: I’ve been in such a situation myself. And here the matter is not that the lawyers have pulled back, no. It’s just that the trial is at such a stage that the prosecution witnesses have clearly fizzled out, but the trial itself does not promise anything out of the ordinary at this stage.

The dismay in the heads of the organizers of the trial has led to a situation where telejournalists from REN-TV have all of a sudden wandered into the trial. Lakhtin nearly had a heart attack: he jumped up, got all bent out of shape… But a court representative explained to him that there is permission. (Later there was a story a whole two minutes long on the news).

The witness Kudasov was treasurer. Standing behind the lectern [as witnesses do in Russian courts–Trans.] is uncomfortable for him, he needs to bend down to the microphone all the time, but his voice doesn’t get any louder for this.

The conversation is taking place between him and the defendants. They are talking about things that are little-comprehensible or completely incomprehensible to the majority of those present, including the judge and the procurators. Drawing up contracts, financial accounting consolidated reporting, capital investments, affiliated companies… Businessmen prattling away in their own language, and one thing never does jump out from their dialogues: the guilt of the defendants.

– Did you transfer money to the personal accounts of citizens?, — asks Khodorkovsky.

— Money, transferred from such companies as «Fargoil», «Energotrade», per agreements for the purchase-sale of oil, which passed through the treasury, was put on the accounts of «Tomskneft», «Yuganskneftegas», «Samaraneftegas», — replies the witness Kudasov.
Lebedev first asked if they are acquainted. «I personally am not acquainted with Platon Leonidovich, a couple of times I saw him at corporate holidays», — clarified the witness to the court. «What is known to you about my activity in the YUKOS oil company?» — «Nothing is known to me». — «I gave you assignments with respect to payments?» — «Did not give».

There were, noted Kudasov, no «global problems» on the part of the organs of currency-and-export control. Nor were there delays in or non-receipt of foreign-exchange proceeds…
And so on, and so forth…

So where, exactly, is the evidence with respect to the indictment? Where are all these articles enumerated on the courtroom doors: «Items «a», «b» pt.3, art.160, pt 3 art. 174, pt.4 art. 160, pt. 3 art. 174,pt.4 art. 174-1 CC RF [Criminal Code of the Russian Federation–Trans.]?

… For a while, the trial moves completely to a stage of torpidity. The journalists stopped clicking on the keyboards of their notebooks. The bailiff at the cage is playing games on his telephone. Shokhin is obviously sleeping. Danilkin is yawning. The lawyers are bored. The witness is drinking a second glass of water. Khodorkovsky moved aside the thick stack of papers which he had been reading until then, and is sitting in the aquarium [in the current trial, the prisoners are not in a cage, but in a bulletproof glass box–Trans.], head bent down – he’s resting. Lebedev is leafing through the volumes of the case and without any hurry posing questions.

With the volumes there’s a problem in general. In order to pose a question, Lebedev first needs to speak about how the sheets of the case file had already been read out. To ask for the volume from the judge, the judge serves it to a lawyer, the lawyer transfers to the witness, that one reads and only then responds to the question that had been posed. Then the used volume floats slowly in the opposite direction – to the judge’s table.

There are more than a hundred and thirty volumes, I will remind!

(From personal observations: the more volumes, the less the likelihood of an acquittal. Otherwise you’d have to admit the impenetrable moronity of those who carved out these 130 volumes).

For an instant the trial was jolted awake from the universal stupor and boredom.

Judge: – Lebedev, you have the 64th volume?

Lebedev: – I don’t have it!

Judge: – So where is it?

Lebedev: – I returned it to you.

Judge: – When? Where can it be? Searches on the table). Ah! Found it! (with a sense of empowerment).

I’m thinking: if in 15 minutes he’s forgotten about where he’d stashed a volume and whether the volume ever existed in the first place, then how does he remember everything that they’ve already examined over a year?

After this the trial once again falls into a semi-sleeping state.
After lunch an enliveliage is sensed. Skirmishes arise between the procurator Lakhtin and Platon Lebedev. The procurator is attempting, posing a question to the witness, to implant in him his incriminatory interpretation of the proffered document. Lebedev, having studied these tricks well, objects against this. A lawyer and the judge join the fray. There are objections and objections to objections. Then they remember about the witness, who, shifting from foot to foot (he – the only one who is standing the entire trial) asks to be reminded what the question was about, because he’s already managed to completely forget it.

Observers of the court trial, which has lasted a year already, have long ago become convinced that Khodorkovsky and Lebedev are asserting their rightness solidly. Which you can’t say about the representatives of the state prosecution.

This is not the first time I have been present at a court trial in the «YUKOS case» and I have long ago observed: the level of preparedness of the procurators for the court sessions is very low. It goes without saying that nobody has the right to demand of Shokhin or Lakhtin the presence of a candidate’s [Ph.D.–Trans.] degree in the realm of economics. From them – by law – is required merely the scrupulous observance of criminal-procedure legislation and the provision of all the evidence according to the charge. Both with the former and with the latter the procurators have obvious problems. These gaps both in the former and in the latter, as it appeared to me, judge Viktor Danilkin often forgives the procurators.

And how not to forgive, if he himself, as it appeared to me, does not completely understand the essence of many of the economic intricacies of this case. Or does not want to understand? BUT such a thing is possible only in the event that the text of the verdict is known in advance.

…The trial continues. Four procurators, seven lawyers, two defendants, a judge and a secretary, over a dozen convoyers-bailiffs… A whole bunch of people engaged daily and not for the first year already in something little-comprehensible.

Observers from Mars in an hour would say: forget about you all, it’s not interesting, because it’s unlawful. It’s better to look at the stars and listen to the rustle of eternity on the wings of the cosmos.

Instead of this we are listening to the rustle of the volumes of the criminal case and through it – the phrase of judge Danilkin:

– I’m covering for myself, so there wouldn’t be a situation…

* * *
In an interview Mikhail Khodorkovsky says: “I understand perfectly well that there are several bureaucrats who initiated the second trial and who want me behind bars forever. But whatever happens, I am going to defend my position and my innocence. Firstly, I don’t think the outcome of the case is preordained. And secondly, I don’t want to allow anyone the possibility to think that I am guilty of something. So I’m going to prove that I am in the right so comprehensively that nobody will have any room left for doubt.”

…I personally have not had any doubts in his rightness for a long time already. If someone of the readers does have some – go down to the court session. There is much you will understand.

Grigory Pasko is a Russian journalist and publisher of an environmental magazine. In November 1997 Pasko was arrested by FSB agents in Vladivostok and accused of espionage for publications on the environmental problems in the Japanese sea but found not guilty due to lack of evidence. He was found guilty of “abuse of his official position,” but released immediately under a general amnesty. He was recognized as a prisoner of conscience by Amnesty International. This article originally (here)  appeared at the Robert Amsterdam: Perspectives on Global Politics and Business website.

Defacto State

By Jim Miles

Part of the dilemma in Palestine is that the more the “peace” process is delayed, moving nowhere, the more Israel gains in the way of confiscated and settled land. There are two basic solutions: either a one state solution (whether bi-national or otherwise); or a two state solution with Palestine existing on some remnant of land left over from Israeli settlement. A recent combination of events/ideas has left me wondering if the one state solution is perhaps the only remaining solution if not the de facto situation now.

Christian Peacemakers

I recently attended a local presentation of Christian Peacemakers (CPT) on their experiences in Hebron in Palestine. The main presenter Johann Funk is a Mennonite who has been to Hebron several times recently. The CPT ideal as presented on their website is a powerful statement of intent:

“CPT embraces the vision of unarmed intervention waged by committed peacemakers ready to risk injury and death in bold attempts to transform lethal conflict through the nonviolent power of God’s truth and love.”

I was highly impressed with the stories presented, the actions of the team members, and the accuracy and depth of Johann’s historical knowledge and theological understanding. I am left with two general reactions. The first is the very positive impression of direct purposeful action of a non-violent but still very dangerous nature used to assist the people of Palestine as they try to survive the everyday suppression of their lives. It is however, one of the introductory images that remained with me the strongest, and it is an image I have seen before, but it keeps changing. That image was the juxtaposition of four maps of Israel/Palestine from before WW II to the present.

Small Green Dots

The first map – and I would expect that most readers are familiar with these maps – showed a small scattering of white dots representing the Jewish settlements mostly along the northern Mediterranean shores of the British Palestinian mandate. The next shows the demarcation lines as proposed by the UN, giving Israel 54% of the land. The third map is the familiar “green-line” map of the era before the 1967 war. The final map – and this is the one that keeps changing – shows what is left of actual Palestinian “controlled” territory. I use the word controlled, as the area is truly under the control of the IDF and its self-made military laws, supported by the “quisling government” [to quote Johann] of the Palestinian Authority.

What is left at the moment is a mere 12% of the original Palestinian territory, broken up into a gerrymandered arrangement of non-contiguous cantonments. These areas represent both refugee settlements from the 1947-48 and 1967 wars and indigenous settlements that have survived in one fashion or another the occupation of surrounding lands.

The 12% Solution – Not Possible

While I have seen the latter map many times before, the green dots this time appeared to be incongruously small and divided: a two state solution – at least from the appearances on the map – is no longer possible. Twelve per cent? Five million people? Scattered villages, refugee camps, water resources confiscated by Israel, farmlands being confiscated directly as military areas or through the archaic three year vacancy rule? Off limit roads bisecting communities? A huge wall snaking its way around, through and between areas of Palestinian land, creating barriers to all walks of life?

No, this scattered confined remnant could never be considered a state except in the fantasies of the upper netherworlds of politicians and religious fanatics. What is actually on the map is one state, the state of Israel, that has incorporated a series of cantonments into the fabric of its existence. These are not benign cantonments, but are harmful to both populations, assuredly much more harmful to the Palestinian population within the cantonments. It is full blown apartheid, except for the regular intrusions of the IDF.

I cannot see in any manner or form that these scattered remnants – without a good agricultural base, without proper water resources, with highly restricted movement not only outside but inside the remnants – could ever exist as a state. Israel, unwittingly, has created a single state solution – a defacto single state solution. What now exists is a single non-democratic state, using apartheid racist tactics to confine one segment of the population (and this is a population that is genetically identical to the original Jewish inhabitants of the land) to a series of what are essentially open air prisons.

Truce?

A day after the CPT meeting, I read an article in Foreign Affairs[1] that in general calls for an immediate truce between the Palestinians and Israel in order that the other problems may be worked out. Apart from being poorly written with scattered threads of arguments intertwining and interjecting one on the other, and really offering nothing new to the situation other than a rewording of ongoing practices and ideas, two main ideas remained from the presentation.

First is the thought that the Palestinians have several times not only offered a truce, but practiced what they preached and established unilateral truces. In particular with the recent Gaza war, it was Israel that broke the truce. The Palestinians were not faultless in this, but few truces (including the long standing one in Korea) have existed without violations from time to time.

The author, Ehud Yarri, argues that the truce would “constitute a major step towards ending the occupation, fundamentally reconfigure the conflict, and make the prospects for a final-status agreement far brighter than ever before.” Sounds great, but it is not significantly different than the ongoing stages of the non-existent peace process. It would not solve the Jerusalem settlements problems, nor discuss the right of return, nor the acceptance of the green line boundaries as the truce line would be “roughly to the lines of the existing security barrier.”

A “limited truce” would allow “further actions to isolate Hamas” and operate “under a national unity government led by the PA.” Yaari argues that the Gaza campaign was a “punitive action” that “compelled Hamas to accept a cease-fire without gaining any relaxation of the siege.” So Hamas, at one moment in time the democratically elected representatives of the Palestinian people (described here as a “setback), is to be isolated (and supposedly eliminated although that is not stated directly).

There is no recognition that Hamas had maintained a cease fire, and had offered a ‘hudna’ long before this article ever existed. To exclude a segment of the population is only to create or extend the hostility of that segment of the population – it is not a solution. Inclusion is a much better prospect, as one can now see in Afghanistan with the Taliban, as was done in Ireland, in South Africa, and with China in the WTO, and generally has a moderating effect on all political players.

Demographics

The second idea rising from the article is the always underlying but seldom stated fear of the changing demographics of the area, that if there was a one state solution the Palestinian population would overwhelm the Jewish population. At the moment in ‘Eretz Israel’, the populations are very close to being equal, with the Palestinian population having the higher birth rate.

Yaari’s fear is that “new concepts will begin to compete as alternatives” as “support for the two-state formula that currently exists will likely erode.” He sees this as a “stealth” tactic by the Palestinians, “accomplishing…the sort of Arab demographic dominance that Israeli leaders have for decades sought to avoid by occupying, rather than annexing, the Palestinian territories,” the latter would force Israel to “coexist alongside an Arab majority within the whole of Palestine.” What a novel idea – co-existence.

The greater fear is demographics:

“Israel must offer Palestinian statehood for less than peace before the Palestinians and their leaders abandon the two-state model altogether.”

De Facto Single State

That is the essence of the article. Unfortunately, looking at the map, looking at the population statistics, looking at the actions of the admitted “occupying” forces, the actual de facto arrangement is that of a single state. It is not a healthy state, but a rogue state, a failed state, a non-democratic state, an apartheid state, one that imprisons, oppresses, tortures and denies half its population any resemblance of a decent living.

Palestinians may wish for an independent state, but available information would indicate that Yaari’s fear, and the larger Jewish fear, of a single unitary state already exists. The problem then becomes where to go from here. Continue the pretence of providing – eventually, after more land is occupied and settled, effectively annexed – for a supposedly independent sovereign Palestinian state? Look for an excuse such as Iran to create a catastrophic event that would allow Israel to evict the Palestinians under the larger media publicity of a wider war with possible nuclear consequences? Or become much more humanitarian, living within the peaceful precepts of all faiths, and accept that two peoples who are essentially and biologically brothers and sisters, could live peacefully side by side in a greater democratic state?

Jim Miles is a Canadian educator and a regular contributor/columnist of opinion pieces and book reviews for The Palestine Chronicle. Miles’ work is also presented globally through other alternative websites and news publications. This article is reprinted with permission.

Notes:

[1] Ehud Yaari. “Armistice Now,” Foreign Affairs. March/April 2010, NY. pp. 50-62.
[2] Michael Brown, Ali Abunimah, and Nigel Parry. “Palestinian population exceeds Jewish population says U.S. government,” The Electronic Intifada, 1 March 2005.

ICC: Judges Approve Kenyan Investigation

A majority of a pre-trial chamber of International Criminal Court (ICC) judges today approved the ICC prosecutor’s request to open an investigation into Kenya’s 2007 post-election violence, Human Rights Watch said. The Kenyan inquiry is the first investigation begun by the prosecutor acting on his own initiative. All previous cases were referred either by the governments concerned or the United Nations Security Council.

The violence that followed Kenya’s flawed 2007 general election left over 1,133 people dead, caused 400,000 to flee their homes, and brought Kenya to the brink of civil war. Kenya has a history of failing to pursue justice for election-related violence; those responsible for past episodes, in 1992 and 1997, have never been brought to justice.

“The decision today can help Kenya turn the corner,” said Elizabeth Evenson, counsel in the International Justice Program at Human Rights Watch. “A full investigation into possible crimes against humanity can help restore confidence among Kenya’s people that elections don’t have to turn into bloodbaths.”

After more than a year of inaction by Kenya’s authorities on national prosecutions for the most recent post-election violence, the ICC prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, sought permission, in November 2009, from a pre-trial chamber of three ICC judges to proceed with an investigation. In its decision today, the chamber by a majority approved that request.

Interest in the issue in Kenya is high, as shown by the near-constant attention by the media over the past year to prospects for an inquiry. The ICC has made efforts in recent weeks to provide basic information about the court to the Kenyan public. Human Rights Watch said the ICC effort has been helpful and urged it to carry out extensive outreach programs in communities affected by the election violence and broader communications efforts about its activities across the country.

Human Rights Watch also recommended that the ICC and its prosecutor apply lessons learned from the ICC’s existing investigations to its new Kenyan inquiry. These include investigating all sides to the violence, and, where there is evidence, bringing charges that reflect the full range of the most serious crimes committed during the post-election violence.

Witness protection will be a key challenge as the ICC’s investigation moves forward. Threats against individuals who witnessed incidents of post-election violence, including some who testified before two investigating panels, have reportedly increased in the months since the ICC prosecutor announced his intention to open a Kenya investigation. Kenya’s existing witness protection system is widely acknowledged to be inadequate and is currently under reform. In January, the ICC prosecutor wrote to Kenya’s justice minister to express concern over the escalation in threats.

“Keeping witnesses safe is a keystone of successful prosecutions, and the ICC should make it a priority to safeguard witnesses and victims in its investigations,” Evenson said.

Investigation and prosecution by the ICC will require the full cooperation of Kenyan authorities. The ICC’s efforts, however, will only target a small number of senior officials. It will be essential for Kenya also to carry out investigations and prosecutions of other perpetrators at a national level to provide full accountability for the post-election violence, Human Rights Watch said. Although Kenyan authorities agreed in December 2008 to hold national trials for post-election violence suspects, several efforts to establish a special tribunal for Kenya failed to garner sufficient support in parliament. The failure to act has reinforced the perception that those responsible for the post-election violence will not be punished, Human Rights Watch said.

“ICC investigations are likely to target only a handful of those most responsible for the post-election violence,” Evenson said. “Kenya’s leaders still need to make good on their promise to complete the job with credible national trials.”

Background

Following the violence generated by the controversial 2007 presidential elections, leaders of both parties agreed to set up the Commission to Investigate the Post-Election Violence (the Waki commission, after its chairman, Justice Philip Waki). They also established an independent review committee to look at the flaws in the election (the Kriegler committee), and a truth, justice, and reconciliation commission to help heal historical grievances dating from well before the 2007 general elections.

The Waki commission recommended wide-ranging reforms of the police as well as the creation of a special tribunal for Kenya, independent of the judiciary, anchored in a constitutional amendment and staffed by both Kenyan and international judges and prosecutors. In the event no special tribunal was established, the Waki commission recommended that former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan – the chair of the negotiations that led to the current coalition government – hand over a sealed envelope containing the names of suspects to the ICC. Annan handed over the envelope and other materials from the Waki commission to the ICC prosecutor in July 2009.

The ICC is the world’s first permanent court mandated to bring to justice perpetrators of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide when national courts are unable or unwilling to do so. Currently, 110 states are parties to the ICC.

The Kenyan investigation will be the ICC’s fifth investigation, and its first opened by the prosecutor using his “proprio motu” powers under article 15 of the Rome Statute. Following voluntary referrals, the ICC prosecutor previously opened investigations in the Democratic Republic of Congo, northern Uganda, and the Central African Republic. The UN Security Council referred the Darfur region of Sudan to the prosecutor. Based on those investigations, 13 arrest warrants and one summons to appear have been issued.

The investigation in Kenya was authorized by a majority of three judges sitting as an ICC pre-trial chamber. In a dissenting opinion, Judge Hans-Peter Kaul held that the crimes committed during the post-election violence did not fall within the ICC’s jurisdiction because there was no reasonable basis to believe that those crimes were committed pursuant to a state or organizational policy, a requirement of a crime against humanity under article 7(2)(a) of the Rome Statute.

The ICC prosecutor is also looking at a number of other situations in countries around the world. These include Colombia, Georgia, Cote d’Ivoire, Afghanistan, and Guinea. The Palestinian National Authority has also petitioned the ICC prosecutor to accept jurisdiction over crimes committed in Gaza.

The ICC is a court of last resort. It only steps in where national jurisdictions are unable or unwilling to prosecute Rome Statute crimes.

Chechen Militant Umarov Says Responsible For Moscow Bombings

Chechen rebel leader Doku Umarov has claimed responsibility for Monday’s suicide bombings in the Moscow subway system.

Umarov, who leads Islamist militants in Chechnya and nearby regions of Russia’s North Caucasus, says he personally ordered the attacks.

In a video posted on the Islamist rebels’ unofficial Web site Wednesday, Umarov says the twin bombings were retaliation for Russian security forces killing civilians in the Caucasus.

One of the metro stations bombed was just meters away from the headquarters of Russia’s Federal Security Service, the FSB. The bombings killed 39 people.

The Chechen rebel leader said attacks on Russia will continue.

Earlier Wednesday, two suicide bombers struck in Russia’s southern republic of Dagestan, killing at least 12 people.

The blasts occurred in the town of Kizlyar, near Dagestan’s border with Chechnya. At least nine police officers were among the dead, including the town’s police chief.

Dagestan’s interior minister says the first suicide bomber detonated explosives when traffic police tried to stop the car he was in. A second bomber dressed in a police uniform set off the other blast as police and residents gathered around the scene of the car bombing. At least 23 people were wounded.

Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has said a single terrorist group may be behind both the Moscow and Dagestan attacks.

Authorities say the Moscow attacks were carried out by two women linked to Islamist insurgents in the restive southern republics.

Last month, Chechen rebel leader Umarov vowed to take the Islamist battle to Russia’s cities.

The head of Russia’s Security Council, Nikolai Patrushev, was quoted as telling the Russian Kommersant newspaper that Russia is also investigating possible Georgian involvement in the metro bombings. He said Russia has information that agents of Georgia’s special forces maintain contacts with terrorist groups in the North Caucasus.

Georgian officials criticized Russia for the statements. But Georgia’s minister for reintegration, Temur Yakobashvili, said Wednesday that Georgia is ready to cooperate in any investigation.

Source: VOA

Gazprom Says Sochi Pipeline On Schedule; Begins Offshore Section

Gazprom is set to constructing the offshore section of the Dzhubga – Lazarevskoye – Sochi gas pipeline in the Black Sea near the city of Tuapse.

Gaprom said construction is being undertaken with the use of the fleet of service vessels comprising, inter alia, the C-Master (operating in medium depth waters) and Bigfoot I (laying pipes in shallow waters) pipe-laying barges. The offshore section is projected to be completed in June 2010.

Overall, the company said, construction of the Dzhubga – Lazarevskoye – Sochi gas pipeline is progressing according to the schedule with 11.8 kilometers of the onshore line pipes have been laid.

Horizontal directional drilling is underway to install the pipeline landfall sections near the city of Tuapse and the Kudepsta settlement, Gazprom said, with identical operations have been completed near the Novomikhailovskoye and Dzhubga settlements.

The Dzhubga – Lazarevskoye – Sochi gas pipeline has been included into the Program approved by the Russian Federation Government and aimed at the construction of Olympic facilities and development of Sochi as a mountain-climatic resort. The pipeline will secure reliable energy supplies to Sochi and to the Olympic facilities under construction, as well as giving a powerful impetus to the gasification advancement in Sochi and the Tuapse District and will considerably cut the energy deficit on the Caucasian coast of the Black Sea.

The gas pipeline will stretch 177 kilometers including a 159.5-kilometer offshore section. The pipeline route will run on the Black Sea bottom along the coastal line (around 4.5 kilometers away from the coast) to the Kudepsta gas distribution station near Sochi.

Drought Places 10 Million West Africans At Risk

Almost 10 million people across the Sahel region of West Africa are threatened with a severe food shortage, international aid agency Oxfam said today. The worst affected country is Niger where 8 million people are at risk. Some 2 million people are threatened in Chad and a substantial number of people are expected to be affected in Mali in the coming months. Parts of Nigeria and Burkina Faso are also at risk.

The agency called upon developed countries to respond urgently to the early warning of impending disaster, citing delays during the Niger food crisis in 2005 that unnecessarily cost lives.

“We are witnessing an unfolding disaster which can be averted if the world acts swiftly. Five years ago the world ignored the warning signs from Niger, failed to act rapidly and lives were lost. The international community cannot make the same mistake and again condemn many children to an early death,” said Mamadou Biteye Oxfam’s West Africa Regional Director.

Irregular rains in 2009 have led to a severe lack of pasture, water and a poor harvest. In Niger, the harvest has fallen by 26 percent as compared with the previous year, and some areas, especially the Diffa in the east of country and Tillabéry to the west, have had no harvest at all. In Chad, harvests have fallen by 34 percent. The areas of Hadjer Lamis, Batha, Kanem, Guera regions and eastern Chad are expected to be hit hard, especially from June 2010. Overall, the harvest in the Sahel has decreased by 9 percent with great disparities between East and West Sahel.

Prices of cereals are high and increasing. Millet and sorghum prices are up to respectively 25 and 50 percent higher than a year ago in Niger. Rains are not expected until June and prices are expected to increase until the next harvest in September without a substantial aid effort.

Pastoralists are especially vulnerable as they depend on animals for their food and income. “With not enough fodder, herders are desperate to sell their animals, driving livestock prices lower and lower,” explains Hassane Baka, a representative of Oxfam’s partner AREN in Niger. “This means that for each animal sold on the market, pastoralists get less cereal with which to feed their families.”

Oxfam called on donors to respond to the government of Niger’s request for international humanitarian assistance. While the authorities have some food reserves, these are currently not sufficient. Up to $123 million was requested to fund the national response plan. The agency also called on donors to address increasing needs in Chad and Mali.

Oxfam also called on all countries in the region to keep their borders open. In 2005, the situation was made worse when neighboring countries closed their borders with Niger. This limited the availability of food and increased inflation. The agency also stressed the need for good coordination between governments, UN agencies, and local and international NGOs to ensure efficient aid delivery.

Oxfam, along with national and local partner organizations, have started emergency work in the most vulnerable regions in Niger, especially in the Maradi, Tahoua, Tillabéry and Zinder regions. They are distributing food and supplies to the poorest households and schoolchildren, protecting livestock and buying weak livestock from herders at above market levels. Particularly important in the current crisis is the early warning system developed by Oxfam’s partners in Niger and broadcasted on rural radio networks. This gives cattle herders the information they need to act quickly.

In Chad, Oxfam is helping people in the Sila and Ouaddaï regions by distributing food and running agricultural and livestock support projects and will be sending assessment teams to the affected areas. In Mali, the agency will be distributing food and animal feed to 100,000 people.

The agency has worked in the Sahel region for decades, developing sustainable solutions to tackle the root causes of food shortages such as creating cereal and fodder banks, promoting income diversification as well as education and literacy.

Umarov Purportedly Claims Moscow Metro Blasts

In a new video posted to an Islamist website, Chechen rebel leader Doku Umarov appears to claim responsibility for two suicide bombings on the Moscow metro system that killed at least 39 people.

A video purporting to be Umarov was posted today on YouTube by the website kavkazcenter.com, an unofficial rebel website.

“The explosions in the Moscow metro were conducted according to my personal order,” the speaker says. “That is a response to the so-called special operations held by Russia’s FSB against noncombatant Chechens in the village of Arshty on February 1.”

Chechen rebels have dismissed as official disinformation claims by Russian forces that all of those killed in fighting near the Chechen border in early February were insurgents or accidental victims.

Rights activists have agreed that civilians killed in those operations appeared to have been deliberately killed, not caught in the crossfire as Russian forces claimed.

The speaker on the video continues, saying attacks against Russia will continue.

“Our action was a legitimate response to the crimes committed by Russians against the poorest and helpless part of the Chechen population. Our attacks in Russian territories will continue. The war will come to Russian cities and towns, so that Russians would not ignore the crimes and violent actions committed by Russian troops in the Caucasus.”

Umarov had vowed in February to stage attacks against Russian cities.

Reuters earlier today quoted a representative of the militant group Umarov leads as denying responsibility for the Moscow attacks.

Copyright (c) 2009. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.

Original article